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PULLING THE "PLENARY AUTHORITY" CARD: THE
UNITED STATES' "GET OUT OF JAIL FREE CARD"
IN MEMBERSHIP DISAGREEMENTS WITH INDIAN
TRIBES
I. INTRODUCTION 1
A tribe's right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been
recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community.
2
From young children to adults, everyone has heard the stories of the friendly
Thanksgiving dinner between the Pilgrims and the Indians and of the Trail of Tears. It is
quite simple to think of Indians as a historical people-without much thought as to who
these people are today. Who are these indigenous peoples? What characteristics or
attributes make each of these people an "Indian"-historically and currently? Is it that a
person has to have a certain amount of Indian blood-or is it that a person must live on a
reservation? Whatever individual determinations a young child or even an educated
adult would make as to what it means to be "Indian," probably very few people would
proffer the suggestion that whether or not a person is an "Indian" depends on the
government's definition of "Indian." Throughout U.S. history, the federal government
has felt an obligation to define what it means to be "Indian." 3 These arbitrary attempts
have resulted in an air of uncertainty regarding tribal identity that still exists today.
Understanding what it means to be an "Indian" is important to different groups and
individuals for very different reasons. For the federal government, "[t]he definition of
'Indian' is the measure of eligibility that the government uses for benefits and
preferences provided to Indians under a variety of federal programs. ' 4 It then follows
that for federal political purposes, "to be considered an Indian one must be a member of
a federally recognized Indian tribe." 5  However, for the average person, the term
1. The author of this article addresses the extension of Indian tribal membership to illegal immigrants
purely for analytical purposes.
2. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32 (1978). Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the
opinion of this famous Indian law case, which discusses the jurisdictional question of tribal membership
decisions. Id. at 50.
3. Margo S. Brownell, Who is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the Question at the Core of Federal
Indian Law, 34 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 275, 278 (2000); see Robert McCarthy, The Bureau of Indian Affairs
and the Federal Trust Obligation to American Indians, 19 BYU J. Pub. L. 1, 40-41 (2004).
4. Brownell, supra n. 3, at 276.
5. McCarthy, supra n. 3, at 41. While this is the case in order to receive federal benefits, tribes can still
gain recognition from state governments and receive limited state benefits, despite an inability to get federal
recognition. See e.g. Alexa Koenig & Jonathan Stein, Lost in the Shuffle: State-Recognized Tribes and the
1
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"Indian" may simply imply "that a person has some Indian blood, and is recognized as
an Indian by the relevant community."
6
These particular definitions may be necessary from a federal or political
approach-but what about from an Indian community perspective? This perspective
embraces the notion that
[s]ome people ... can be an Indian for one purpose but not for another. A Caucasian or
person of little Indian ancestry might become a tribal member by adoption for some
purposes, such as voting and participation in tribal government, but not be an Indian for
purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction. An Indian whose tribe has been terminated will
not be considered an Indian for most federal purposes. Nevertheless, such a person
remains an Indian ethnologically and continues to be a tribal member for internal tribal
7purposes.
It follows then, from an individual and tribal cultural perspective, that being "Indian"
cannot be defined by political or governmental criteria designed for governmental
purposes. Unfortunately, though, for Indians, the federal government has defined their
ethnology and culture this way. Thus, governmental attempts to define "Indian" are
complicated by the fact that Indians address identity or tribal membership in a different
manner. 8 Because the two perspectives are incompatible, conflict is inevitable.
Further complicating the issue of Indian membership determinations is a new
group of people: illegal immigrants. In an attempt to circumvent the unwieldy U.S.
immigration system, many illegal immigrants have sought shelter from deportation
within the confines of non-federally recognized tribes in the United States.9 Government
officials have discouraged illegal immigrants, warning them that "[h]aving a card issued
by a tribe, recognized or not, doesn't imply any legal immigrant status to the bearer."
10
Currently, the United States recognizes the sovereign right of Indian tribes to make
membership determinations.11 Government officials argue, though, that tribal-issued
membership cards do not extend U.S. citizenship or legal immigrant status under U.S.
immigration laws, nor do they extend the right to stay in the United States legally.
12
However, by fully recognizing a tribe's sovereign authority in membership
determinations, the government would have to acknowledge those individuals the tribes
recognize as members. In the case of illegal immigrants, the government's
acknowledgment of a tribe's sovereign rights to membership determinations would
extend to the acknowledgement of illegal immigrants as tribal members. The question,
then, important to the present discussion, is whether tribes, through these cards or other
means, really can extend federally recognized membership in a tribe to illegal
Tribal Gaming Industry, 40 U.S.F. L. Rev. 327, 328 (2006) (referring to a subset of America's tribal population
that has been subjugated, yet never officially recognized by the federal government).
6. McCarthy, supra n. 3, at 40.
7. Brownell, supra n 3, at 277 (quoting Felix Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 26 (1982 ed.,
Michie 1982).
8. Id. at 276-77.
9. S. E. Ruckman, Some Illegals Seek Tribal Cover, Tulsa World A25 (Aug. 26, 2007).
10. Id. (quoting Christopher Bentley, a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services spokesperson).
11. See generally Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 49.
12. Id.
[Vol. 43:119
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immigrants.
This article argues that, as the law currently stands, they can. Currently, the courts
have held that the power to determine Indian tribal membership lies exclusively with the
tribes. If this were true, Indian tribes would not only have the power to extend
membership to illegal immigrants, but the United States would recognize illegal
immigrants' status as members of their respective tribes. Unfortunately, however, in
establishing a policy of tribal sovereignty, the federal government did not anticipate
illegal immigration as a factor. Thus, despite case law, which articulates complete tribal
sovereignty in the area of tribal membership and concurring federal Indian policy, the
federal government will most likely exert its plenary authority over the Indian tribes-
thus refusing to recognize this extension of membership to illegal immigrants. In either
not allowing Indian tribes to extend membership to illegal immigrants or disallowing
these immigrants the ability to stay on the reservation, the United States is retreating
from its policy of Indian tribal sovereignty in tribal membership determinations and
revealing a watered-down version of tribal sovereignty.
Part II of this article will address the historical evolution of the definition of
"Indian" and of membership criteria. Part III will address the constant jurisdictional
battle between Indian tribes and the federal government over which rights still lie within
the sovereign powers of the Indian nations and in what areas the United States has
asserted jurisdiction. Part IV of this article will tackle an overview of the membership or
citizenship requirements one must achieve in order to become a U.S. citizen. Part V will
briefly discuss the federal government's approach to membership jurisdictional issues
concerning the current plight of the Cherokee Freedmen. Parts VI and VII will return to
the membership question and conduct an analysis of whether, in light of the
aforementioned discussion, tribes can extend federally recognized membership to illegal
immigrants.
II. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF WHAT IT MEANS TO BE "INDIAN"
From the government's point of view, the greatest concern is the extent to which
statutes and regulations providing benefits to Indians are based on potentially
unconstitutional racial criteria: blood quantum and Indian descent. 
13
The federal government, for purposes of making land and benefit allocations for
Indians, had to devise a way to determine who the federal government would recognize
as an Indian. 14 Through various legislation and court decisions, the federal government
has attempted to make this determination.
15
A. General Allotment Act
Governmental attempts at defining who was an "Indian" date as far back as the
13. Brownell, supra n. 3, at 277.
14. Id. at 279 (stating that in order to make a qualified assessment as to who was deserving of an allotment
of land, the government had to rely on blood quantum in making determinations as to who was "Indian").
15. See generally id.
2007]
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early 18th century.16 However, it was not until the late 19th century that Congress made
an official attempt to define what it means to be "Indian."'17 In 1877, Congress passed
the Dawes Severalty Act, also known as the General Allotment Act. 18 The purpose of
the General Allotment Act was to partition reservations into separate distinct parcels 19 of
land and then deed the land "in trust" 20 for a period of twenty-five years. 2 1 At the
completion of this twenty-five year term, individual Indians "would receive a patent in
fee, free of encumbrance and fully alienable. ' 22 Because of these offers of land from the
federal government, many non-Indians, in an effort to acquire free land under the Act,
attempted to pass themselves off as Indians or claimed to be members of a tribe.
2 3
Inevitably then, with the threats of abuse in the assignment of allotments, came the
necessary problem of how to determine who would qualify as an Indian and be eligible
to receive an allotment.
24
Recognizing the potential for such problems, various federal laws required the
Department of Interior (DOI) to make membership determinations as to who qualified as
"Indians" "for purposes of distributing Indian allotments and land claims judgments."2 5
The government compiled these determinations into tribal membership rolls.26  The
government then distributed allotments based on who qualified as an "Indian" and had
their name listed on the tribal membership rolls.
27
At that time, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) 28 maintained the tribal
membership rolls. 29  The government's objective in maintaining BIA oversight of the
rolls was "accurate and equitable distribution of benefits" to Indians. 30 In an attempt to
16. Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 1935, 51 S.D. L. Rev. 1
(2006). "Virginia... appears to have been the first to articulate a specific amount of blood, by defining
mulatto in 1785." Id. at 5.
17. Id. at9.
18. Pub. L. No. 49-119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
19. Sharon O'Brien, American Indian Tribal Governments 77 (U. Oklahoma Press 1989) ("Generally,
heads of families received 160 acres and single persons over eighteen years of age received 80 acres. All other
tribal members received 40 acres.").
20. Judith V. Royster, The Legacy ofAllotment, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 8 (1995) (citing Morrison v. Work, 226
U.S. 481, 485 (1925)).
21. Id. at 10.
22. Id.
23. Gail K. Sheffield, The Arbitrary Indian: The Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 82 (U. Oklahoma Press
1997).
24. Id.
25. Carole Goldberg, Members Only? Designing Citizenship Requirements for Indian Nations, 50 U. Kan.
L. Rev. 437, 457 (2002).
26. Brownell, supra n. 3, at 279-80 (explaining that the Dawes rolls "listed the blood quantum of individual
Indians" and the government relied on these blood quantums on the rolls to make determinations as to who was
Indian). For further discussion on the use of blood quantum, see Nicole J. Laughlin, Identity Crises: An
Examination of Federal Infringement on Tribal Autonomy to Determine Membership, 30 Hamline L. Rev. 97,
101 (2007).
27. Laughlin, supra n. 26, at 101.
28. The BIA is an arm of the Department of Interior. For a discussion on the role of the BIA in Indian
Affairs, see generally McCarthy, supra note 3.
29. Melissa L. Meyer, American Indian Blood Quantum Requirements: Blood is Thicker than Family, in
Over the Edge: Remapping the American West 231, 232 (Valeria J. Matsumoto & Blake Allmendinger, eds., U.
California Press 1999).
30. Id. at 232.
[Vol. 43:119
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assure compliance with the government allotment process, the BIA created the Dawes3 1
Commission to organize the rolls. 32 The BIA anticipated the Commission's work would
result in complete tribal membership rolls, which would then "[codify] each Indian
person's status as a member of a specific tribe."
33
Because governmental benefits were predicated on the determination of who was
an "Indian," the Commission went to great lengths to determine the accuracy of their
tribal membership rolls. 34 In doing so, it was necessary for the Commission to verify
with each individual Indian from each tribe "his or her name, address, tribal membership
and quantum of Indian blood."3 5 The General Allotment Act itself contains no reference
to blood quantum determinations for the allotment of Indian lands.36 Without strict
direction, "courts and executive branch officials applied varying rules to specific
situations, utilizing the language of blood, but not necessarily applying blood quantum to
divide Indian from non-Indian or tribal member from non-member."
37
Although, from the perspective of the federal government, blood quantum would
become an accepted and "important method of defining Indian and tribal membership...
in the early twentieth century," this acceptance was not absolute. 3 8 Indians were not
familiar with the concept of blood quantum as a marker of identity, but were instead
historically dependent on the notion of kinship to identify what it meant to be "Indian":
Kinship not only included those with whom one could trace familiar common descent, but
could be extended to include more ramifying groups like clans, moieties, and even nations.
Moreover, besides biological reproduction, individuals and groups could be recruited into
kinship networks through naturalization, adoption, marriage, and alliance. Identity
encompassed inner qualities that were made manifest through social action and cultural
belief.
39
The concept of partitioning off pieces of land to various people based on blood "directly
conflicted with the widespread cultural belief that land should be shared communally."40
This belief that kinship was the basis of identity and membership determinations in a
particular tribe further complicated the Commission's attempt to classify Indians and
members of Indian tribes.4 1 The Commission members encountered many who would
not participate in the process of verifying their blood quantum or tribal membership. 42
31. Vine Deloria, Jr. & Clifford M. Lytle, American Indians, American Justice 9 (U. Texas Press 1983).
The commission is named after Senator Henry Dawes of Massachusetts. He "assumed leadership of the forces
that sought to make allotment and assimilation the national policy." Id.
32. Laughlin, supra n. 26, at 104 ("The ultimate determination of whether an individual had the requisite
fraction of Indian 'blood' to be considered a member of a certain tribe was left up to the Commission.").
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting Carla D. Pratt, Tribes and Tribulations: Beyond Sovereign Immunity and Toward
Reparation and Reconciliation for the Estelusti, 11 Wash. & Lee J. Civ. Rights & Soec. Just. 61, 100 (2005)).
36. Id.
37. Spruhan, supra n. 16, at 9.
38. Id. at 4.
39. Laughlin, supra n. 26, at 101.
40. Id. at 105.
41. Pratt, supra n. 35, at 100-01 ("[T]he Commission faced resistance, particularly from the full bloods
who refused to be enrolled.").
42. Id.
2007]
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Accordingly, these people were absent from the tribal membership rolls and not
considered official members of their respective tribes, despite their Indian blood.
43
B. Indian Reorganization Act (IRA)
44
Despite the lack of "a uniform application of blood quantum in federal Indian
law,' ' 5 and the absence of blood quantum requirements under the General Allotment
Act, the federal government sought to utilize blood quantum standards in the Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA). 46 Congress adopted this standard partly because "the bill was
controversial when presented to Congress" due to the "significant philosophical shift in
47 48Indian policy" it represented. The IRA included many reforms to federal Indian law,
but most notable to this discussion was the enablement of tribes to create their own
constitutions.4 9  By enabling tribes to write their own constitutions, the IRA half-
heartedly attempted to end the use of race as criteria for tribal membership, thus giving
the tribes greater determination in their identities.
50
This gifl of sovereignty in determining membership was not without governmental
limitations.5 1 While the IRA would seem to have allowed tribes the freedom and ability
to make their own membership determinations, "BIA approval of [the] constitution" was
still necessary. 52 For example, Section 16 of the Act allowed, "[a]ny Indian tribe, or
tribes, residing on the same reservation... to organize for its common welfare," but their
constitutions would be "subject to BIA approval.,53 However, this approval only applies
to the tribes that adopted IRA constitutions and other constitutions that retained the BIA
approval clause.54 Many tribes do not have this approval clause in their constitution.
55
Many tribes that originally did require approval have passed amendments to their
constitutions removing this clause.
56
43. Goldberg, supra n. 25, at 457 ("Unfortunately, these federally-mandated lists are sometimes inadequate
and incomplete, excluding some people with deep and continuous tribal connections, whose ancestors failed to
show up for the sign-ups because their traditional beliefs counseled nonparticipation or for other culturally-
based reasons.").
44. Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2000) (enacted by Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984, 984-
88 (1934)).
45. Spruhan, supra n. 16, at 9.
46. Id. at 46-47.
47. Id. at 46.
48. Sheffield, supra n. 23, at 43-44.
49. Pub. L. No. 73-383, § 16, 48 Stat. 984, 987.
Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same reservation, shall have the right to organize for its
common welfare, and may adopt an appropriate constitution and bylaws, which shall become
effective when ratified by a majority vote of the adult members of the tribe, or of the adult Indians
residing on such reservation, as the case may be, at a special election authorized and called by the
Secretary of the Interior under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe.
Id.
50. L. Scott Gould, Mixing Bodies and Beliefs: The Predicament of Tribes, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 702, 720-
21(2001).
51. Goldberg, supra n. 25, at 446-47.
52. Gould, supra n. 50, at 721.
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. O'Brien, supran. 19, at 83.
55. Id.
56. Id.
[Vol. 43:119
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While not explicitly stating who could and could not be tribal members, the IRA
indirectly maintained control of tribal rolls by defining who could be an Indian under
federal law.57 According to Section 19 of the IRA, there are three categories of Indians:
The first class, described as the "Membership Class," includes "all persons of Indian
descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe" and is defined without regard to
blood quantum. The second class, described as the "Descendant Class," includes "all
persons who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within
the present boundaries of any Indian reservation" and is defined without regard to either
blood quantum or tribal membership. The third class, described as the "Unaffiliated One-
Half Blood Class," includes "all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood' and thus
offers eligibility for benefits to those who are not tribal members or residents on a
reservation.
5 8
If a person fit one of these three categories, they were a federally recognized Indian, and
with this recognition came benefits from the federal government. 59  However, the
benefits afforded were less important than the governmentally created definition of
"Indian," which snuck its way into the "newly created tribal constitutions." 60
C. Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)
In 1968, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). 6 1 With the ICRA,
Congress sought to impose statutory rights similar to many constitutional protections on
tribal members and others within the jurisdiction of the tribe. 62  Congress based its
decision largely on the fact that because tribal governments were not created under the
U.S. Constitution,63 many of the protective provisions of the Constitution did not apply
to Indian members.64 The Act itself imposed ten statutory rights on the tribes, but did
not go so far as to grant all the rights U.S. citizens enjoy under the Constitution.6 5 The
57. Brownell, supra n. 3, at 285.
58. Id. at 285-86 (emphasis added).
59. Laughlin, supra n. 27, at 108.
60. Id.
61. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303.
62. Laughlin, supra n. 27, at 108 n. 69 (offering as an example the language from 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8)
which parallels the Due Process Clause: "No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its law or deprive any person of liberty or property
without due process of law.").
63. O'Brien, supra n. 19, at 197 (stating that "tribal governments... sprang from a power, or sovereignty,
in existence before the Constitution and the federal government existed").
64. Laughlin, supra n. 27, at 108-09 (citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896)). In Talton, the
plaintiff alleged that his conviction was void because his indictment was returned by a grand jury consisting of
five jurors, and the laws of the United States and the laws of the Cherokee nation required a thirteen-person
grand jury for the purpose of indictments. 163 U.S. at 378. Talton argued that, as a result, he was denied his
due process guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 379. The court disagreed
with Talton, stating that the U.S. Constitution did not apply to a Cherokee tribal member who acted criminally
within Cherokee jurisdiction. Id. at 384-85. The court stated that seeing "as the powers of local self-
government enjoyed by the Cherokee Nation existed prior to the constitution, they are not operated upon by the
fifth amendment." Id. at 384.
65. Laughlin, supra n. 27, at 108 n. 69 (quoting 25 U.S.C § 1302). The statute reads:
No Indian Tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall (1) make or enforce any law
prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances; (2) violate the
2007]
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ICRA did not address the effect this legislation and these statutory rights would have on
tribal membership determinations. 66 As a result, the courts would have to determine
whether the right to assert membership in an Indian tribe existed.
67
III. TRIBAL JURISDICTION AND THE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both
before and since the Revolution, to the people of the United States, has always been an
anomalous one, and of a complex character.
6 8
The issue of membership determinations in Indian tribes, just as with citizenship in
the United States or any other nation, eventually boils down to jurisdiction.
6 9
Jurisdiction, generally speaking, is the legal authority of a government to make laws and
govern its own people. Issues of jurisdiction and related questions of authority are
central in the discussion of tribal sovereignty and decision-making. 7 1 The jurisdiction of
a particular government can encompass such things as "defining crimes and punishment
for those crimes, and regulating such things as domestic relations, hunting and fishing,
taxation, zoning and economic development." 72 One type of jurisdiction is territorial
jurisdiction. 73  This type of jurisdiction addresses the "geographic area over which a
government's authority extends." 74  The jurisdiction of Indian tribes is "limited
geographically to 'Indian [C]ountry."' 7 5  However, tribal jurisdiction within these
boundaries is not complete. In certain instances, such as with criminal jurisdiction, the
federal government has recognized the right to "assert jurisdiction over purely Indian
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized; (3) subject
any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy (4) compel any person in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself; (5) take any private property for a public use without just
compensation; (6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and public trial,
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense; (7) required excessive bail, impose excessive fines,
inflict cruel and unusual punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any
penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of one year and a fine of $5,000, or
both (8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any
person of liberty or property without due process of law; (9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post
facto law; or (10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the right,
upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
25 U.S.C. § 1302.
66. See generally id
67. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 49.
68. U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,381 (1886).
69. O'Brien, supra n. 19, at 198.
70. Kirke Kickingbird, Foundations of Sovereignty and Jurisdiction: A Miniconference of the Native
American Legal Resources Center 14 (Oklahoma City U. June 1988).
71. O'Brien, supran. 19, at 198.
72. Kickingbird, supra n. 70, at 14.
73. O'Brien, supra n. 19, at 198.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 205.
[Vol. 43:119
8
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 43 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss1/7
PULLING THE "PLENARYA UTHORITY" CARD
matters in Indian territory." 76 However, "[i]n the area of civil jurisdiction over Indian
Country the working rule remains that the Indian nations retain all their jurisdictional
powers over the people and property within their territory except where restricted by a
treaty provision or an Act of Congress."
77
Congress, through Indian-related legislation, has articulated three types of lands
that fall within Indian territorial jurisdiction.78  These lands are considered "Indian
Country" and consist of "(a) reservations, (b) dependent Indian communities and (c)
Indian allotments." 79 All three land types included in "Indian Country" are important in
determining tribal jurisdiction. They are important because "Indian Country" is the area
in which tribes have jurisdiction, and only tribes that are federally or state recognized
and have a political relationship with the U.S. government have such areas.
80
Reservations are included in the designation of "Indian Country" because they typically
"represent the aboriginal territory of an Indian nation and/or lands negotiated for by an
Indian government with the United States or a colonial government." 8 1 The second of
the land types included as part of "Indian Country" are dependent Indian communities.
82
These lands include the communities that are not an actual part of an Indian reservation,
but for various reasons are still parts of the Indian community. 83  These dependent
Indian communities are included in "Indian Country" because they are part of the land
set aside for the tribe and even though they are separate from the reservation, they still
require the protection of the federal government. 84 Not all of the off-reservation tribal
lands are considered Indian Country--only those to which the government holds in trust
for the Indians. 85 The third of the land types included in "Indian Country" are the lands
that were part of the allotments, which the federal government designated under the
General Allotment Act.
86
Even in "Indian Country," there are limitations to Indian jurisdiction.8 7  For
76. Kickingbird, supra n. 70, at 21.
In 1816, Congress passed the General Crimes Act which made all federal criminal laws applicable
to Indian Country except where: (1) offenses are between Indians; (2) an Indian has already been
punished under tribal law; or (3) exclusive jurisdiction over a particular offense has already been
reserved by a tribe in a treaty .... The Major Crimes Act of 1885 is the first major federal statute
which allowed the federal government to assert jurisdiction over purely Indian matters in Indian
territory. The act as amended gives federal courts jurisdiction over fourteen violent crimes even in
cases where the crime was committed by one Indian against another.
Id. at 21-22.
77. Id. at 22.
78. Id. at 15.
79. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1151).
80. O'Brien, supra n. 19, at 90-91.
81. Kickingbird, supra n. 70, at 15.
82. Id. at 15 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1151) (Indian Country includes "all dependent Indian communities within
the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and
whether within or without the limits of the states.").
83. Id.
84. Id. at 15-16 (citing US. v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913)).
85. O'Brien, supra n. 19, at 205-06.
86. Kickingbird, supra n. 70, at 16.
87. O'Brien, supra n. 19, at 198-200. "Before white settlement, tribal governments enjoyed full
jurisdictional powers within their territories. Today their jurisdiction is no longer total. Two hundred years of
tribal-federal contact have greatly reduced tribal authority in certain areas." Id. at 198.
2007]
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various reasons, the U.S. government has determined that because "Indian Country" falls
within the territory and geographical boundaries of the United States, the United States
"has ultimate 'title' to all lands which are held in 'trust' for the Indians." 88 As a result,
"Indian Country" is federal land and the federal government has the right, if it chooses to
assert it, to claim jurisdiction over the lands. 89
A. Federal Recognition of Tribes
In shaping a governmental definition of what it meant to be an "Indian," the
government not only attempted to control the definition of who could be an "Indian," but
also what it meant to be truly recognized as an Indian tribe.90 The federal government
has four categories tribes can fall into based on their political relationship with the
government. 91 The categories are "(1) federally recognized tribes; (2) state-recognized
tribes; (3) terminated tribes; and (4) unrecognized tribes." 92 For tribal members to be
eligible for services and benefits, such as health care, from the federal government, they
must be members of a federally recognized tribe.93 There are currently 561 federally
recognized tribes in the United States.94 In order to be federally recognized, tribes must
meet recognition criteria that are "promulgated by the DOI through the Bureau of Indian
Affairs Branch of Acknowledgement and Research. '95 These criteria require that to be a
federally recognized tribe, the tribe:
(1) . .. must have been identified as an American Indian entity since 1900; (2) it must
comprise a distinct community and have existed as a community from historical times; (3)
it must have political influence over its members; (4) it must have membership criteria; and
(5) it must have a membership that consists of individuals who descend from a historical
Indian tribe and who are not enrolled in any other tribe.96
A consequence of federal recognition is that the government typically sets aside
land for tribal use.97 Originally, tribal settlements spread across the United States. With
the growth of these settlements, the federal government recognized a need to designate
boundaries for these tribal settlements. 98 The government forced relocation of many of
the tribes to "a large area between the Mississippi River and the Rocky Mountains." 99
The government then established settlements, or reservations, for these tribes. 100 The
federal government still holds most reservation areas for the use and occupation of the
88. Kickingbird, supra n. 70, at 18.
89. Id.
90. Brownell, supra n. 3, at 301.
91. O'Brien, supran. 19, at90.
92. Id.
93. Brownell, supra n. 3, at 301.
94. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services From the United States Bureau of Indian
Affairs, 70 Fed. Reg. 13,648 (Mar. 22, 2007).
95. Brownell, supra n. 3, at 301.
96. Id. at 302 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(a)-(f) (1999)).
97. O'Brien, supra n. 19, at 214.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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Indian tribes. 
10 1
State recognized tribes do not have a political relationship with the federal
government. 102 However, these tribes do typically live on state reservations and receive
some form of state funding. 103 The two other Indian tribe classifications are terminated
tribes and unrecognized tribes. Terminated tribes no longer have a relationship with the
federal government, no longer have reservation lands, and "are no longer eligible for the
special services and benefits granted to federally recognized tribes."'104 Unrecognized
tribes have never had a political relationship with the federal government.' 5 These
tribes, similar to terminated tribes, "have no tribal land and receive none of the special
services or benefits given to recognized tribes."
' 10 6
B. The Plenary Authority of the United States over Indian Tribes
One manner in which the United States has claimed jurisdictional power in "Indian
Country" is through the plenary authority the federal government considers itself to have
over Indian affairs. 10 7 This plenary authority derives from the trust relationship that the
courts have determined the United States has with the tribes. 10 8 This trust relationship is
the foundation for Congress's plenary, or "almost absolute,
' 1 °9 power over the tribes. 10
Because of this plenary authority, Indians no longer have exclusive jurisdiction within
"Indian Country." '1 11 There is no one document or case that articulates the exact duties
of the U.S. trust relationship. 112 Instead, this trust relationship between the government
and the Indian people has developed from various "treaties, court decisions, federal
statutes and the Constitution itself."
'1 13
Kirke Kickingbird, an Indian scholar, has studied this trust relationship between
the United States and Indian tribes and has determined there are three areas that define
the trust duties of the United States: "1) Protection of Indian trust property. 2) Protection
of the Indian right to self-government. 3) Provision of those social[,] medical[,] and
educational services necessary for the survival of the tribe." 114 Fulfilling these duties is
within the exclusive power of Congress 1 5-thus, Congress alone "has the power to
101. See id. at 213-15. In contrast, the Five Civilized Tribes and the Seneca Indians "possess full title to
their lands." O'Brien, supra n. 19, at 215.
102. See id. at 90.
103. Id.
104. Id. at90-91.
105. Id. at 91. "Unrecognized tribes, of which there are more than two hundred, have no political
relationship with the federal government because they have never made a treaty with the United States, nor
have they ever received federal recognition through executive or congressional action." O'Brien, supra n. 19,
at 91.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 199.
108. Kickingbird, supra n. 70, at 17-18.
109. Id. at 18.
110. Id.
111. O'Brien, supran. 19, at 198.
112. Kickingbird, supra n. 70, at 18.
113. Id. at 17. SeeO'Brien, supran. 17, at 199.
114. Kickingbird, supra n. 70, at 18.
115. Id.
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change and redefine the scope of the relationship." 116  The Constitution does not
explicitly give Congress these duties or designate Congress as the trustee in this
relationship.117 Instead, the courts have determined through case law that Congress has
this authority over the tribes. 118  Furthermore, Congress, the ultimate trustee and the
holder of power, can use this plenary power to assert jurisdiction over Indians in its
attempt to protect Indians and Indian tribes.
11 9
C. The Role of the Courts in Jurisdictional Questions of Membership
In interpreting the U.S. trust relationship with the tribes, courts have had to address
questions of jurisdiction in "Indian Country." 120 More specifically, the court has had to
respond to questions concerning whether the power to enact and administer laws in
"Indian Country" lies with the federal government, or with the tribes. In determining
with whom jurisdiction lies in the question of membership, there are various "complex
and often conflicting variables such as treaties a tribe may have made with the federal
government, statutes passed by Congress, federal court decisions, specific tribal laws,
state laws and the economic and political climate at any one time."' 12 1
The underlying theme of each of these variables is "special trust duties with
respect to Indian nations that.., have allowed Congress broad power in Indian
affairs."'122 This "unique legal and moral duty of the United States to assist Indians in
the protection of their property and rights" is often what deprives Indians of jurisdiction
in their own nations.123 Because Indian tribes are nations 124 that "exist[ ] within the
boundaries of the United States," history has afforded them a "special relationship with
the United States government." 12 5 In U.S. v. Wheeler, the Court determined: "Indian
tribes are, of course, no longer 'possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty.' Their
incorporation within the territory of the United States, and their acceptance of its
protection, necessarily divested them of some aspects of the sovereignty which they had
previously exercised." 126  As a result, tribes retained limited tribal jurisdiction. 127
Furthermore, their jurisdictional rights exist only with the consent of Congress and
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Kickingbird, supra n. 70, at 18.
120. See e.g. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (holding that a severance tax on an oil
and gas lease that was located on the reservation and was enacted by the tribes on non-Indian lessee was within
the tribe's jurisdiction); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that, unless
otherwise authorized by Congress, Indian tribal courts do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians);
Fisher v. Dist. Ct., 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (determining that in an adoption proceeding where Indians are seeking
to adopt the child of Indian parents and all involved were residents of the same Indian reservation, the tribal
courts had exclusive jurisdiction over the adoption).
121. Kickingbird, supra n. 70, at 20 (emphasis added).
122. id. at 18.
123. Id.
124. O'Brien, supra n. 19, at 58.
125. Kickingbird, supra n. 70, at 17.
126. 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (quoting Kagama, 118 U.S. at 381).
127. Id.
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Congress can take away those jurisdictional rights. 128 However, "until Congress acts,
the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers.
' 129
1. U.S. v. Kagama
In US. v. Kagama, the Court recognized the plenary authority of the federal
government over Indian tribes and the government's ability to use this authority to limit
jurisdiction. 130 The Court held that the federal government was in a position to act in the
best interest of Indian tribes. 13 1 In Kagama, two Indians, Kagama and Mahawa, were
charged with murdering Iyouse, another Indian. 132 One of the central concerns was
whether the United States had jurisdiction over an Indian who committed a crime upon
another Indian in "Indian Country."' 133 In the Major Crimes Act of 1885,134 Congress
gave the power to "the federal government to assert [criminal] jurisdiction over purely
Indian matters in Indian territory."' 13 5 The Court determined that even though an Indian
committed the crime, against an Indian, on an Indian reservation (which would typically
fall under Indian jurisdiction), the federal government could assert jurisdiction. 136 In
making this determination, the court stated:
These Indian tribes are wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the
United States, dependent largely for their daily food; dependent for their political rights.
They owe no allegiance to the states, and receive from them no protection.... From their
very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the federal
government with them, and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty
of protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the executive,
and by congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen. 1
37
The Kagama decision was notable because the Court held "that the government
had absolute authority to define how it would 'protect' Indian tribes."' 138 As a result,
under the guise of protecting the Indian people, Congress was able to "pass laws which
enable the United States to assert jurisdiction over them., 139 This plenary authority is
central to jurisdictional questions concerning tribal membership.
2. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
Because Congress did not explicitly retain control of tribal membership in the
ICRA or even address the application of the ICRA to the issue of tribal membership
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. O'Brien, supran. 19, at 199.
131. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384.
132. Id. at 376.
133. Id.
134. Pub. L. No. 48-389, § 9, 23 Stat. 381, 385 (1885).
135. Kickingbird, supra n. 70, at 21.
136. Kagama, 118 U.S. at384-85.
137. Id. at 383-84.
138. O'Brien, supra n. 19, at 73.
139. Kickingbird, supra n. 70, at 18.
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determinations, this daunting jurisdictional task was left to the courts. 14 0 In 1978, in the
landmark decision of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Court held that tribal
membership is an exclusively tribal determination. 14 1
In Santa Clara Pueblo, a female member of the Santa Clara Pueblo tribe, 142 along
with her daughter, brought an action against her tribe alleging that a membership
ordinance of the tribe violated Section 8 of the ICRA. 143 This ordinance denied tribal
membership to children of female tribal members who married outside the tribe. 144 The
Santa Clara Pueblo tribe also had an additional ordinance disallowing the naturalization
of non-tribal members, thus foreclosing her husband and children from membership. 145
Because the children were not recognized as Santa Clara Pueblo tribal members, if the
mother passed away, they would "ha[ve] no right to continue living on the reservation, or
any right to inherit their mother's house or her possessory interests in communal
lands."
, 14 6
In addressing Martinez's claim under the ICRA, the Court determined that the case
turned on whether "Title I of the ICRA purports to subject tribes to the jurisdiction of the
federal courts in civil actions for injunctive or declaratory relief."' 147  The Court
concluded that it did not.14 8 The Santa Clara Pueblo Court noted:
A tribe's right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized
as central to its existence as an independent political community. Given the often vast gulf
between tribal traditions and those with which federal courts are more intimately familiar,
the judiciary should not rush to create causes of action that would intrude on these delicate
matters. 1
4 9
The Court determined that it was essential for membership determinations to remain with
tribes because membership is at the heart of tribal identity. 15°  Thus, placing tribal
membership requirements with the tribe itself "secure[d] the critical right of tribes to
preserve their tribal identities." 
151
140. Laughlin, supra n. 27, at 109.
141. 436 U.S. at 72 n. 32.
142. O'Brien, supra n. 19, at 27. "The Spanish called these Indians 'Pueblos' because their houses were
fashioned around closely clustered communities similar to pueblos (villages) of Spain." Id. (emphasis in
original).
143. 436 U.S. at 51. The statute provided that "[n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government
shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty
or property without due process of law." Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1970)).
144. Id. at 52.
145. Id. at 52 n. 2.
146. Laughlin, supra n. 27, at 118 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 52).
147. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 72 n. 32 (internal citations omitted). Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered this opinion, which
Justices Brennan, Stewart, Powell, Stevens, and Chief Justice Burger joined. Id. at 50. Justice Rehnquistjoined in all but Part III of the opinion. Id. Justice White was the only dissenter. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436
U.S. at 50.
150. Id. at 72 n. 32; accord Laughlin, supra n. 27, at 119 ("The ability of Indian tribes to determine
membership is critical to the maintenance of tribal sovereignty because membership is at the core of a tribe's
identity.").
151. Laughlin, supra n. 27, at 119.
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IV. TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP DETERMINATIONS: THE CHEROKEE FREEDMEN
A recent controversy, which further affirms the U.S. policy of an Indian tribe's
sovereign right to determine their own membership, is the situation of the Cherokee
Freedmen. The Cherokee Freedmen were "African-descended people who had been
owned by Cherokees until their emancipation by the Nation in 1863." 152 Three years
later, in the Treaty of 1866, the Cherokee Nation agreed to make the Freedmen members
of the Cherokee tribe and to reflect their membership in the Cherokee constitution. 153 In
Article III of the 1975 constitution, the Cherokee Nation "extended membership to all
the people who were 'citizens' of the Cherokee Nation as listed on the Dawes
Commission Rolls," 154 which included the Cherokee Freedmen.
155
In addition to the constitutional provisions on membership, the Cherokee Nation
later enacted further membership requirements to supplement the constitution via
statutory regulations. 156 One such regulation, 11 C.N.C.A § 12, stated:
A. Tribal membership is derived only through proof of Cherokee blood based on the Final
Rolls. B. The Registrar will issue tribal membership to a person who can prove that he or
she is an original enrollee listed on the Final Rolls by blood or who can prove to at least
one direct ancestor listed by blood on the Final Rolls. 
157
This statute directly conflicted with the Cherokee Nation constitution, which did not
require Cherokee blood for membership in the tribe. 158 The above statute, as enacted,
required all members to have Cherokee blood.
A Cherokee Freedman, who was denied membership in the Cherokee Nation based
on her lack of Cherokee blood, challenged this statutory provision. 159  The plaintiff,
Lucy Allen, filed her claim in the Cherokee tribal courts. 160  The tribal court, in its
opinion, discussed jurisdictional issues surrounding this case. 16 1 The court determined
that the Cherokee tribal courts are the only venue for this type of claim. 162 In fact,
federal courts dismissed lawsuits of other Cherokee Freedmen based on sovereign
immunity and the fact that questions of membership were within the jurisdiction of the
152. S. Alan Ray, A Race or a Nation? Cherokee National Identity and the Status of the Freedmen's
Descendants, 12 Mich. J. Race & L. 387, 390 (2007).
153. Id.
154. Allen v. Cherokee Nation Tribal Council, No. JAT-04-09, slip op. at 2 (Jud. App. Trib. Cherokee
Nation Mar. 7, 2006). Article III of the Cherokee Nation constitution states:
All members of the Cherokee Nation must be citizens as proven by reference to the Dawes
Commission Rolls, including the Delaware Cherokees of Article II of the Delaware Agreement
dated the 8th day of May 1867, and the Shawnee Cherokees as of Article III of the Shawnee
Agreement dated the 9th day of June, 1869, and/or their descendants.
Id. at 3 (citing Cherokee Const. art. III, § 1 (1975) (emphasis omitted)).
155. Id. at 5-6.
156. Id. at 5.
157. Id. at 4.
158. Allen, slip op. at 1.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at2.
162. Id
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tribes. 163
In making its determination, the court looked to the Cherokee constitution to
determine the validity of the statute. 164 The constitution is based on the Dawes Rolls,
and the Dawes Rolls clearly include the Freedmen as Cherokee citizens. 165 The court
further noted that if
the Cherokee Nation is going to make a decision not to abide by a previous treaty
provision, it must do so by clear actions which are consistent with the Cherokee Nation
Constitution. A treaty provision cannot be set aside by mere implication. This treaty
discussion leads to the same conclusion as the constitutional discussion. If the Cherokee
people want to change the legal definition of Cherokee citizenship, they must do so
expressly. 
166
Because the statute contradicted the constitution, the court determined the constitution
preempted this statutory provision and the Cherokee Freedmen were citizens under the
Cherokee constitution. 167
In response to this decision by the highest court of the Cherokee Nation, the
Cherokee tribal council took matters into its own hands.168 The tribal council passed a
proposed amendment to the constitution, which would "grant citizenship only to
Cherokees (or their descendants) with a degree of Cherokee 'blood' or adopted
Delawares or Shawnees (or their descendants) with a degree of Delaware or Shawnee
'blood' as determined by the Dawes Rolls." 169 In order to pass this resolution, Cherokee
citizens had to approve it by a majority vote. 17° On March 3, 2007, the resolution
passed 17 1 with almost 77 percent of Cherokees voting to "amend the nations'
constitution to remove the [F]reedmen descendants and other non-Indians from tribal
rolls." 172 Currently, the Cherokee Freedmen no longer have citizenship in the Cherokee
tribe. 1
73
It is not only sovereign immunity that prevents the federal court system from
deciding the membership issue concerning the Cherokee Freedmen. It is also the tribe's
sovereign right to membership determinations. 174 In Nero v. Cherokee Nation of
Oklahoma, several Cherokee Freedmen members sued the Cherokee nation for denial of
benefits and a right to vote in the Cherokee election. 175 In addition to the discussion of
tribal sovereign immunity from the Freedmen's suit, the court also stated in its opinion
163. Allen, slip op. at 2 (citing Nero v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 892 F.2d 1457 (10th Cir. 1989)).
164. Id. at 14.
165. Id. at 6-7.
166. Id. at 20.
167. Ray, supra n. 152, at 391-92.
168. Id. at 388-89.
169. Id. at 389.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Justin Juozapavicius, Freedmen issue on Detour to Capitol Hill, http://www.indiancountry.com/content
.cfm?id=1096415816 (Sept. 28, 2007) ("Only a fraction of the nation's tribal citizens-about 9,000-cast
ballots" in the special election.).
173. Jeninne Lee-St. John, The Cherokee Nation's New Battle, http://www time'com/time/nation/article/
0,8599,1635873,00.html (June 21, 2007).
174. Nero, 892 F.2d at 1463.
175. Id. at 1458.
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"that no right is more integral to a tribe's self-governance than its ability to establish its
membership."' 176  The court further stated that if they were to get involved with
membership determinations, it "would in effect eviscerate the tribe's sovereign power to
define itself, and thus would constitute an unacceptable interference 'with a tribe's
ability to maintain itself as a culturally and politically distinct entity."' 177 Thus, the
court, based on the strong U.S. policy of tribal sovereign power in membership
determinations, dismissed the suit of the Cherokee Freedmen.
178
As a result of the federal courts' refusal to get involved with tribal membership
issues, legislators on Capitol Hill have threatened to challenge tribal sovereignty in
membership determinations. U.S. Representative Diane Watson has proposed legislation
to withhold $300 million in federal money from the Cherokee tribe if they do not
"reinstate 2,800 descendants of the tribe's former black slaves." 1 7 9 Watson's next step
in the legislative process "is to gain sponsors for the bill and get it a joint hearing of the
Judiciary and Natural Resources committees." 180 As it stands, Congress has taken no
official action and the Freedmen's "fate, as well as the fate of the tribe, remains in
doubt." 18
1
V. IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Congress's plenary authorization applies not only to Indians, but also extends to
immigration law as well. 182 Under the U.S. immigration system, only immigrants that
have legally navigated their way through the system can stay legally in the United
States.183 A brief discussion of the basic structure of the immigration system provides
insight into why immigrants would be desperate to circumvent such a system.
The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), an agency within the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), currently oversees national immigration
services and benefits in the United States. 184 USCIS and DHS have not always been in
charge of immigration benefits and services. 18 5 In March of 2003, the "service and
benefit functions of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) transitioned
into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS)." 186  As the new agency in charge of immigration
176. Id. at 1463.
177. Id. (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72).
178. Id. at 1466.
179. Juozapavicius, supra n. 172.
180. Jerry Reynolds, Congressional Black Caucus Hosts Rally against Cherokee Nation,
http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1096415884 (Oct. 5, 2007).
181. Indianz.com, Cherokee Nation Holds Election Amid National Scrutiny, http://www.indianz.com/
News/2007/003593.asp (June 25, 2007) ("Amid controversy, the Freedmen were [temporarily] reinstated in
order to participate in [the June 23, 2007] election ....").
182. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Semblances of Sovereignty: The Constitution, the State, and American
Citizenship 7 (Harvard U. Press 2002).
183. See generally Alison Siskin et al., CRS Report for Congress RL 33351, Immigration Enforcement within
the United States (Cong. Research Serv. Apr. 6, 2006).
184. U.S. Citizenship Immigr. Servs. (USCIS), About Us, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (accessed
Apr. 9, 2008).
185. Id.
186. Id.
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services and benefits, USCIS oversees and conducts all "adjudication of immigrant visa
petitions; adjudication of naturalization petitions; adjudication of asylum and refugee
applications; adjudications performed at the service centers; and all other adjudications
performed by the INS."'
18 7
Immigration law in the United States falls within the rule of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA). 188 The INA is contained in the U.S. Code, but it stands alone as
its own body of law. 189  Generally speaking, "[i]mmigration enforcement is the
regulation of those who violate provisions of the ... INA."'190 These violations of the
INA can be civil or criminal. 19 1 The general provisions of the INA are "interpreted and
implemented by regulations" in Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 19 2 These are
the laws that USCIS uses daily when assessing services and benefits.
193
The U.S. immigration system is an attempt to regulate the entry, exit, and stay of
"aliens" in the United States. 194 An alien is "any person not a citizen or national of the
United States." 195 For purposes of assessing benefits and services, immigration law
further breaks down the term alien into immigrant and nonimmigrant aliens.
196
Immigrants, or resident aliens, 197 have been permitted by USCIS to stay permanently in
the United States, and in fact, such aliens are "expected to proceed to citizenship" in the
United States. 198  Nonimmigrant aliens are those people who are only admitted for
"temporary periods and are expected to return to their countries of origin." 199 This
includes such people as "students, tourists, diplomats, and temporary workers."
200
Contrary to what many may believe, "[b]eing illegally present in the U.S. has
always been a civil, not criminal, violation of the INA."20 1 There are many instances in
which a person could be illegally present in the United States, but not have entered the
country illegally. For example, if a nonimmigrant's worker visa expires or if a visiting
student's status changes while in the United States, those non-immigrants would be, at
that point, unlawfully present in the United States.2 02 There are also criminal penalties
187. Id.
188. USCIS, Immigration and Nationality Act, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (accessed Apr. 9,
2008).
189. Id. The INA also has code designations. However, it is more common to use the INA citation for
immigration law. Id.
190. Siskin et al., supra n. 183, at Summary.
191. Id.
192. USCIS, Title 8, Code of Federal Regulations, http://www.uscis.gov/propub/ProPubVAP.jsp?dockey=
68ba267609da05e 160433ee0f3c73289 (Apr. 2008).
193. Id.
194. Christian Joppke, The Evolution of Alien Rights in the United States, Germany, and the European
Union, in Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices 38-39 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas
Klusmyer eds., Carnegie Endowment Intl. Peace 2001).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 39.
198. Id.
199. Joppke, supra n. 194, at 39.
200. Id
201. Siskin et al., supra n. 183, at 8.
202. Id.
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and violations in the INA. 20 3 Such violations include "the bringing in and harboring of
certain undocumented aliens[,] ... the illegal entry of aliens[,] ... and the reentry of
aliens previously excluded or deported." 2°4  Most of the immigration administrative
processes and adjudications, though, are civil proceedings. 205
A. Becoming a U.S. Citizen
Just as Indian tribes have designated membership criteria for citizenship in a
tribe, 20 6 the federal government has established criteria or standards of naturalization for
U.S. citizenship. 207 First, an applicant must be at least eighteen years of age in order to
become a naturalized citizen.20 8 The applicant must also have been lawfully admitted to
the United States for permanent residency, have resided continuously as a permanent
resident in the United States for at least five years prior to filing, and actually have been
present in the United States for half of that five years. 209 The permanent resident alien
must also display "good moral character. '2 1°  Included in this requirement for good
moral character is the requirement that an applicant must show an attachment to the U.S.
Constitution. 2 11 There is also an educational aspect to naturalization. 212  There is a
general requirement that applicants be able to read, write, and speak the English
language.213 Applicants must additionally complete a test as to their "knowledge and
203. Id.
204. Id. at 8-9. Additional "criminal provisions include § 243(a) disobeying a removal order, § 1306
offenses relating to the registration of aliens, and § 274A(f) engaging in a pattern or practice of hiring illegal
aliens." Id. at 9 n. 34.
205. Siskin et al., supra n. 183, at 8.
206. O'Brien, supra n. 19, at 200.
207. USCIS, General Naturalization Requirements, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (accessed Apr. 9,
2008).
208. 8 U.S.C. § 1445(b).
•209. Id. at § 1427(a).
210. Id. Regarding "good moral character," the USCIS notes:
A person cannot be found to be a person of good moral character if during the last five years he or
she: has committed and been convicted of one or more crimes involving moral turpitude; has
committed and been convicted of 2 or more offenses for which the total sentence imposed was 5
years or more; has committed and been convicted of any controlled substance law, except for a
single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana; has been confined to a penal
institution during the statutory period, as a result of a conviction, for an aggregate period of 180
days or more; has committed and been convicted of two or more gambling offenses; is or has earned
his or her principal income from illegal gambling; is or has been involved in prostitution or
commercialized vice; is or has been involved in smuggling illegal aliens into the United States; is or
has been a habitual drunkard; is practicing or has practiced polygamy; has willfully failed or refused
to support dependents; has given false testimony, under oath, in order to receive a benefit under the
Immigration and Nationality Act.
USCIS, supra n. 207.
211. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a).
212. Id. at § 1423(a)(1)-(2).
213. Id. at § 1423(a)(1). Exemptions to this requirement do exist. Applicants are exempt if they
have been residing in the United States subsequent to a lawful admission for permanent residence
for periods totaling 15 years or more and are over 55 years of age; have been residing in the United
States subsequent to a lawful admission for permanent residence for periods totaling 20 years or
more and are over 50 years of age; or have a medically determinable physical or mental impairment,
where the impairment affects the applicant's ability to learn English.
USCIS, supra n. 207.
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understanding of the fundamentals of the history, and of the principles and form of
government, of the United States." 214 Lastly, applicants must take an oath of allegiance
swearing to
support the Constitution of the United States; . . . to renounce and abjure absolutely and
entirely all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of
whom or which the applicant was before a subject or citizen; ... to support and defend the
Constitution and the laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic;..
. to bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and.., to bear arms on behalf of the United
States.",
2 15
In 2006, DHS estimated that the "median time elapsed between the date of legal
immigration and the date of naturalization was seven years." 2 16 However, the time one
waits to naturalize can extend much longer.2 17 Upon completion of the qualifications, as
long as that may take, the applicant will become a citizen of the United States and have
the opportunity to reside legally in the U.S. as a citizen.
2 18
More controversial than U.S. immigration citizenship procedures is the issue of
illegal immigration in the United States. DHS defines illegal aliens, or unauthorized
residents, 219 as "all foreign-born non-citizens who are not legal residents. Unauthorized
residents refer to foreign-born persons who entered the United States without inspection
or were admitted temporarily and stayed past the date they were required to leave."
220
As of January 2006, DHS estimates there were 11.6 million illegal immigrants living in
the United States.
22 1
Because of the procedural red tape and the wait that accompanies legal attempts to
enter the United States or to become a citizen, illegal immigration has become a growing
problem. 222  As a result, immigrants are looking for ways to circumvent the U.S.
immigration system and naturalization requirements, but still lawfully reside in the
United States.
223
VI. WHO HAS THE RIGHT?
The likelihood that the line between Indian law and immigration law will become
hazy is highly probable. In fact, recently, the Kaweah Indian Nation, a non-federally
recognized tribe, offered illegal immigrants the option of purchasing membership to the
214. 8 U.S.C. § 1423(a)(2).
215. Id. at § 1448.
216. John Simanski, Annual Flow Report: Naturalization in the United States: 2006 4 (May 2007) (available
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/Natz01 Sec508Compliant.pdf).
217. Id.
218. Id. (tbl. 7).
219. Michael Hoefer et al., Population Estimates: Estimates of Unauthorized Immigration Population
Residing in the United States: January 2006 1 (Aug. 2007) (available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
statistics/publications/illpe_2006.pdf).
220. Id.
221. Id. This number is calculated by taking the total foreign-born population living in the United States on
January 1, 2006, and subtracting the legal resident population on that same date. Id.
222. Sergio Bustos, Backlog Keeps Immigrants Waiting Years for Green Cards, http://www.usatoday.com/
news/washington/2005-01-26-immigration-waitx.htm (Jan. 26, 2005).
223. Ruckman, supra n. 9.
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their tribe as a means of moving freely about the United States. 2 2 4 In early August, two
Mexican nationals were charged with making false claims of U.S. citizenship based on
their purchase of membership in the Kaweah Nation.225 While government officials
made it clear that tribal membership offers will not result in U.S. citizenship, 226 they
failed to address the question of whether the tribe could extend tribal membership to the
couple. The true issue at hand is not whether tribal membership is an attempt by the
Mexican couple or other illegal immigrants to become U.S. citizens. Instead, the more
interesting question is: Will the United States adhere to its established policy of
recognizing tribal sovereignty in Indian membership determinations--the result of which
could allow illegal immigrants to become full-fledged members of a federally recognized
Indian tribe. Or, will the United States strip Indian tribes of this firmly rooted sovereign
right by not recognizing illegal immigrants' new status and rights as tribal members-
including the right to stay in Indian Country as members of their respective Indian tribes.
The recognition of the sovereign right of tribes to make membership
determinations has developed slowly, culminating in the Santa Clara Pueblo decision
wherein the Court expressly clarified this sovereign right.22 7 In the past, however, the
courts have viewed this sovereign right against a backdrop that did not contemplate
illegal immigrants. The current issue then becomes whether this right will prevail--even
when it may afford illegal immigrants an opportunity to circumvent immigration laws.
Which is more important? Government officials, in response to the Kaweah situation,
say tribes do not have the authority to give illegal immigrants the right to legally stay in
the United States.228 With whom does the authority to determine tribal membership lie?
Can the federal government ignore the well-settled doctrine of tribal sovereignty in
membership determinations, because of a risk that illegal immigrants will enroll as
members in Indian tribes? The implications of these answers are critical.
This article argues that the power to make tribal membership determinations, as the
law currently stands, is within the jurisdiction of the tribes. In order to fully address the
current state of law as to tribal membership determinations, this article will first pose a
hypothetical to which to apply the law. It will then discuss the tribe's sovereign right to
determine membership under the current law, and then address the government's options
if they choose to take proactive steps to prevent the execution of this sovereign right.
224. Cindy Gonzalez, Tribe's Offer of Citizenship Spurs Warning, http://www.omaha.com/index.php?u
_page=2798&usid= 10104086 (Aug. 10,2007).
225. Roxana Hegeman, 2 Arrested in Immigration Probe Linked to Unrecognized Tribe,
http://www.bluecorncomics.com/stype785.htm (Aug. 13, 2007).
226. Gonzalez, supra n. 224.
227. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72. Regarding membership the court determined that
unless... Congress makes clear its intention to permit the additional intrusion on tribal sovereignty
that adjudication of such actions in a federal forum would represent, we are constrained to find that
§ 1302 does not impliedly authorize actions for declaratory or injunctive relief against either the
tribe or its officers.
Id.
228. Gonzalez, supra n. 224.
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A. Tribe X and Family Z
2 2 9
Tribe X is a small Indian nation in Oklahoma. Tribe X is federally recognized and
established its constitution under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1936. Until recently,
Tribe X's constitutional membership provisions only provided application of
membership to people who are descendants of members of Tribe X, who possess one-
half or more Indian blood, or who were listed on the Dawes Rolls. Recently, however,
Tribe X passed an amendment to their constitution, which included an opportunity for
application of membership by those who are living on the reservation and have shown a
commitment to the culture and traditions of Tribe X.
Family Z has lived on Tribe X's reservation for the past ten years. Family Z came
into the United States legally ten years ago on visitor visas. Instead of leaving when
their visas expired, Family Z remained in the United States. The mother of the family
runs a daycare on the reservation, which all the children on the reservation attend. She
teaches the children tribal traditions, history, and games based on the curriculum
provided to her by parents and elders of the tribe. The father works as a carpenter,
spending the better part of his ten years on the reservation making repairs to various pre-
existing buildings and structures. The family participates in all tribal events and
celebrations. The family is in the United States illegally.
B. Evolution of Membership Determinations to the Current Law
Currently, tribes possess the sovereign right to determine membership, and Tribe X
can amend its constitution to allow for the extension of membership to Family Z.
2 30
Tribal membership has evolved into a determination within the jurisdiction of the people
whom it affects-the tribes. Under the General Allotment Act, the federal government
divided communal lands into allotments and distributed the parcels to Indians. 23 1 The
government determined who was eligible for allotments, and, as a result, who could
receive property as an "Indian." 232 The federal government took the determination of
who was an Indian away from the tribes and granted land allotments based on
governmental determination, not on notions of tribal identity and qualifications.
233
With the passage of time, the federal government recognized greater sovereignty of
the tribes and the right to tribal self-government. 234 The law began to evolve and the
right of membership determinations began to shift gradually from the control of the
federal government to the jurisdiction of the tribes. With the IRA, tribes were able to
determine their own membership criteria and set other governing features. 2 35 The IRA
229. Tribe X and Family Z are purely hypothetical.
230. O'Brien, supra n. 19, at 83, 200.
231. Spruhan, supra n. 16, at 23-24.
232. See generally id. at 24-26.
233. Id.
234. O'Brien, supra n. 19, at 86. In the early 1960s and 1970s, governmental studies concerning Indian
affairs recommended that "Indians be given greater self-determination, that is, greater control in governing
their reservations and greater participation in planning federal Indian policy." Id.
235. Pub. L. No. 73-383, § 16, 48 Stat. 984, 987.
Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same reservation, shall have the right to organize for its
common welfare, and may adopt an appropriate constitution and bylaws, which shall become
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allowed for constitutional construction that did not require federal oversight or approval
of the constitutions. 236  Tribes were free to construct constitutions with membership
provisions based on their own criteria and qualifications.
In a further attempt to protect tribal rights, Congress granted various statutory
protections, similar to various U.S. constitutional protections, to tribal members through
the ICRA.237 While the ICRA did not explicitly state it was within the tribe's sovereign
rights to make membership determinations, 23 8 it also did not claim governmental
jurisdiction over membership determinations. Congress did not explicitly address
membership determinations in the ICRA and did not attempt to retain control of tribal
membership. 239 Therefore, with whom the power lay was still ambiguous. However,
the Supreme Court in Santa Clara Pueblo clarified any possible confusion as to whether
a tribe would have the sovereign right to make tribal membership determinations.
With Santa Clara Pueblo, the policies from the past hundred years regarding
membership determinations culminated in a decision recognizing the rights of tribes to
make their own membership determinations. 240 In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court held
that tribal membership determination is exclusively within the sovereign right of the
tribes. 24 1 In its decision, the Court stated that this right of the tribe "has long been
recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community."24 2 Like
the hypothetical Tribe X, the Santa Clara Pueblo tribe made distinct changes to its
membership determinations based on their own desires and not on governmental
requirements or pressures. 24 3  Since Santa Clara Pueblo, tribes and the federal
government have all acted in conformity with the notion that this right to membership
determinations lies within tribal sovereignty.
244
Recently, the Cherokee Freedmen tested this sovereign right of the Cherokee
Nation to make membership determinations. 245 The federal courts affirmed the rule in
Santa Clara Pueblo by maintaining a hands-off approach with the Cherokee Freedmen
situation and leaving membership determinations to the Cherokee tribe. 246 Legislators
and commentators have expressed much disappointment and discontent regarding the
treatment of the Cherokee Freedmen, and there have been discussions regarding the
effective when ratified by a majority vote of the adult members of the tribe, or of the adult Indians
residing on such reservation, as the case may be, at a special election authorized by the Secretary of
the Interior under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe.
Id.
236. O'Brien, supra n. 19, at 83.
237. Laughlin, supra n. 27, at 108 (citing as an example 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8), which prohibits Indian tribes
using their "powers of self-government" to "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its
law or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law").
238. See generally 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
239. Id.
240. 436 U.S. 49.
241. Id. at 72 n. 32 (citing Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 219 (1897)).
242. Id.
243. See e.g. id at 52 n. 2.
244. Allen, slip op. at 2 ("When other Cherokee Freedmen have asked the federal courts to enforce their
rights ... the federal courts have properly dismissed those lawsuits.").
245. See generally id.
246. Id. at 2 (citing Nero, 892 F.2d 1457).
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withdrawal of federal appropriations to the Cherokee tribe.24 7 However, Congress has
taken no formal legislative action.24 8 Currently, the Freedmen are no longer citizens of
the Cherokee tribe.
249
C. Current Law Applied to Tribe X
The right to make membership determinations clearly lies within the sovereign
rights of Tribe X. They can extend membership to Family Z. Currently, U.S. policy is
clear and unambiguous: Membership rights are within a tribe's jurisdiction. If this were
true, the right to determine membership would be not only a sovereign right of Tribe X,
but also a means for Family Z to stay in the United States legally. This sovereign right to
determine membership coupled with the tribe's jurisdictional powers over Indian
Country, or their reservation, as currently recognized by the federal government, would
afford Family Z the ability to stay on the reservation, within the boundaries of Indian
Country, legally, not as U.S. citizens, but as tribal members.
Tribe X created their constitution under the authority of the IRA. Originally, their
constitution included the previously mentioned IRA categories of Indians and a
government approval clause. However, they later amended the constitution to remove
the governmental oversight requirement and the IRA categories of Indians. At the point
in which they removed these provisions, BIA approval of any provisions in their
constitution was no longer necessary. 250 They are free to add or remove provisions as
the tribe deems necessary-this includes membership provisions.
25 1
Similar to Tribe X, the Santa Clara Pueblo tribe made distinct changes to its
membership determinations based on tribal desires, not on governmental requirements or
pressure. 252 In Santa Clara Pueblo, the children of a female member of the Santa Clara
Pueblo tribe were prohibited from becoming members of the tribe. 253 Because they did
not have Santa Clara Pueblo blood, the tribe refused to allow them to become members,
and the Court held this was within the right of the tribe to determine. 254 Tribe X draws
support for its new amendment and membership decision from Santa Clara Pueblo. The
Court's adamant expression of the necessity of a tribe to be able to make their own
membership determinations is the basis for Tribe X's decision to extend membership to
Family Z. This necessity is present whether the tribe is seeking to include members with
general Indian blood or members who are attached in dedication and spirit to the tribe.
Since Santa Clara Pueblo, tribes and the federal government have all acted in
conformity with the notion that this right to membership determinations lies within the
jurisdiction of the tribes.255
Tribe X, and other federally recognized tribes, as part of its relationship with the
247. Juozapavicius, supra n. 172.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. O'Brien, supra n. 19, at 83.
251. See Pub. L. No. 73-383, § 16,48 Stat. at 987.
252. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 52 n. 2.
253. Id. at 52.
254. See id. at 52, 72 n. 32.
255. Allen, slip op. at 2.
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government, possesses land for the use and occupation of the tribe. 256  Tribes retain
jurisdiction over these recognized tribal boundaries, unless Congress expressly takes it
away. 2 57 As discussed previously, there are three types of land that comprise Indian
jurisdiction: reservations, dependent tribal communities, and allotments. 2 58 It is within
this Indian Country that tribes retain jurisdiction.2
59
Tribe X, because of their relationship with the government and granted reservation
lands, has jurisdiction within their reservation. It is within these lands that Tribe X can,
to some extent, assert jurisdiction and enforce tribal laws.260  Without federal
recognition, a tribe has "no tribal land and receive[s] none of the special services or
benefits given to recognized tribes." 261 The Kaweah tribe, for example, is not a
federally recognized tribe and, in turn, has no recognized tribal lands. 262 Without these
recognized tribal lands, the Kaweah tribe has no federally recognized boundaries in
which to assert jurisdiction. Therefore, U.S. jurisdiction never gives way to the tribal
jurisdiction of a federally recognized tribe. Without federal recognition and recognized
tribal boundaries, the Kaweah tribe is unable to assert jurisdiction over illegal
immigrants.
Tribe X is federally recognized and has recognized tribal boundaries over which to
assert its jurisdiction. Tribe X's jurisdiction over the affairs of its members only extends
to the boundaries of Indian Country.263 Illegal immigrants may fall within the law of the
tribes when they are within tribal boundaries and are tribal members, but this does not
make the immigrants U.S. citizens. In 1924, the Indian Citizenship Act (ICA) issued
citizenship to qualified Indians.264  Under the ICA, the federal government issued
certificates of citizenship to those Indians who were "born within the territorial limits of
the United States."26 5 Family Z, despite the extension of membership in Tribe X, was
not born in the territorial limits of the United States. Therefore, they have membership
rights in Tribe X, but no rights as U.S. citizens. Without this U.S. citizenship, Family Z
is only lawfully present in the United States when within the territorial boundaries of
Tribe X, or its Indian Country.266 As long as Family Z remains within these territorial
boundaries, Tribe X maintains jurisdiction over them.2 67 However, at the point Family
256. O'Brien, supra n. 19, at 62.
257. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 ("In sum, Indian tribes still possess aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by
treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.").
258. Kickingbird, supra n. 70, at 15.
259. O'Brien, supra n. 19, at 198 ("Tribal geographic jurisdiction generally encompasses what is known as
'Indian [C]ountry."').
260. Kickingbird, supra n. 70, at 20.
261. O'Brien, supra n. 19, at 91.
262. Id. at 205-06.
263. Kickingbird, supra n. 70, at 22 (Jurisdiction has been withdrawn however, if it has been "restricted by a
treaty provision or an Act of Congress.").
264. Wilcomb E. Washburn, The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History--Volume
1112209 (Random H. 1973).
265. Id.
266. See Kickingbird, supra n. 70, at 23-24 ("Indian governments have inherent jurisdiction to regulate their
own affairs as well as all activities occurring within their territory .... Tribes have the fundamental right to
determine citizenship.").
267. Id. at 23 ("United States courts have upheld a tribe's power to enforce its laws regarding crimes and
taxation, thus it can reasonably be concluded that tribal jurisdiction extends to all aspects of civil law.").
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Z leaves the territorial boundaries of the reservation, they would be unlawfully present in
the United States, just as if they had entered into another country, and would be subject
to the laws of that country.
Tribe X's jurisdiction within Indian Country would be upset if the federal
government asserted jurisdiction.268 The federal government has asserted jurisdiction
over criminal affairs in Indian Country through the General Crimes Act and the Major
Crimes Act of 1885.269 However, generally speaking, civil jurisdiction within Indian
Country remains within the jurisdiction of the tribes. 2 7  Tribal law generally prevails on
civil matters in Tribe X.2 71 Family Z overstayed their nonimmigrant visas ten years ago.
Their unlawful presence in the United States is a civil violation of immigration law, not a
criminal violation.2 72 Because their presence is a civil violation and because they are
tribal members, it would fall within the jurisdiction of the tribal courts to prosecute. 273
Under current law, as long as Tribe X recognizes Family Z as lawful members who are
lawfully present in the boundaries of Tribe X's territory, Family Z may legally remain in
the United States within the boundaries of Tribe X. Tribe X's power to assert
jurisdiction over matters in Indian Country, coupled with the United States's recognition
of their right to determine membership of their tribes, is the basis for this authority.
VII. PULLING OUT THE "CARDS"
As the law currently stands, tribal membership determinations lie within the
jurisdiction of Tribe X and other Indian tribes similarly situated. This right to determine
membership is a firmly-rooted attribute of Indian self-governance. 274  But, what if
Congress decides Tribe X cannot extend membership to illegal immigrants and, in turn,
uproots this facet of Indian self-governance? As displayed throughout history,275
Congress maintains the ultimate right, if it chooses to assert it, to claim jurisdiction over
Indian lands and tribes.
276
Since September 11, 2001, immigration has been at the forefront of discussions in
Congress, the 2008 Presidential debates and campaign, and every breakfast room table
and water cooler across the country. 277 The growing numbers of illegal immigrants in
268. Id. at 22.
269. Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty:
The Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 18-21 (1993).
270. Kickingbird, supra n. 70, at 22.
271. Id.
272. Siskin et al., supra n. 183, at 8.
273. Kickingbird, supra n. 70, at 23.
274. Nero, 892 F.2d at 1463.
275. McCarthy, supra n. 3, at 46.
Although tribes retain considerable authority over the conduct of both tribal members and
nonmembers on Indian land, or land held in trust for a tribe by the United States, Congress and the
Court have imposed a number or restrictions on tribal jurisdiction, sometimes by expanding state
and federal jurisdiction into Indian country.
Id.
276. Kickingbird, supra n. 70, at 18.
277. See e.g. Jennifer Ludden, Q&A: Inside the Immigration Debate, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=5303676 (Mar. 28, 2006).
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the United States exacerbates the current concern over terrorism.2 78 In the wake of the
terrorist attacks and additional national threats, the federal government has focused its
priorities on "strengthening borders in the name of national security." 2 79  National
security, not indigenous rights, is propelling the current political debate. Family Z may
pose no terrorist threat to the United States. However, the situation viewed in a broader
sense exposes a loophole in the immigration system that can be viewed as a threat to
national security.
With efforts to maintain tribal identity and culture, this identity-related right to
membership determinations serves as the cornerstone of Indian culture. The federal
government is faced with quite the conundrum. On the one hand, the federal government
has an established and vocal history of recognizing the sovereign authority of tribes in
membership determinations. On the other hand, in recognizing this sovereign right in its
entirety and permitting tribes to extend federally recognized membership to illegal
immigrants, the federal government faces national security concerns for which the
consequences could be disastrous.
The federal government historically holds a "get out of jail free card" for situations
such as the one posed in the hypothetical, which would allow illegal immigrants to stay
in the United States. It is up to the federal government, however, whether it will choose
to pull this card. In fact, the United States has two of these cards: The "federal
recognition ' 2 8° card and the "plenary authority ' 28 1 card. It is inevitable that the federal
government will choose national security over Indian sovereignty. But the point still
remains that as the law currently stands, the federal government must make a decision
between the two: Recognize the sovereign right to extend membership to illegal
immigrants or prohibit it. In a threat of removal of federal recognition designation and a
claim of plenary authority, the United States could, at its convenience, assert jurisdiction
over the tribes and refuse to recognize the extension of membership to illegal
immigrants. The question is whether the government will disregard firmly rooted tribal
autonomy in the area of membership determinations.
The government can assert jurisdiction over membership determinations directly or
indirectly. It can do so directly by asserting its plenary authority over the tribes, or it can
do so indirectly by removing the tribe's federal recognition and along with it, services,
benefits, and tribal lands.
A. Pulling the Federal Recognition Card
Because of Tribe X's extension of membership to illegal immigrants, Congress
could and probably would end the government's special relationship with Tribe X by
revoking their federal recognition. Tribe X is currently a federally recognized tribe, and
the power to revoke that federal recognition lies with Congress.2 82 The result of such
legislation would be the end of the special relationship between Tribe X, or a similarly
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. McCarthy, supra n. 3, at 34-35.
281. Id. at 18.
282. O'Brien, supra n. 19, at 90.
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situated tribe, and the federal government.
283
What would be the repercussions of ending this relationship? The current law that
leaves the right to membership determinations to the individual tribes would remain
intact. However, absent federal recognition, it would mean little. The tribe would no
longer be eligible for federal benefits and services. 284 The tribe would no longer receive
federal funds or federal assistance. More importantly, though, federal recognition is a
"prerequisite for the development of tribal self government" and without this
recognition, the government would no longer recognize the sovereignty of the tribe.285
It would fall under the designation of a terminated tribe and be without a reservation and
federal benefits.
28 6
Currently, Tribe X is a federally recognized tribe and has sovereignty and
jurisdiction over their lands-unless and until the federal government takes that
jurisdiction away.2 87 Congress could strip Tribe X of its jurisdiction by voting to pass
legislation to remove its federally recognized status. 2 88  As a result, the federal
government would no longer recognize Tribe X as a sovereign nation. A necessary
element for Tribe X to allow illegal immigrants to remain legally within its tribal
boundaries is its recognized tribal boundaries flowing from federal recognition.289 As a
part of its federal recognition, the federal government recognizes the tribe's right to
assert some jurisdiction within these boundaries. 29  Thus, with the loss of its
sovereignty, Tribe X would lose the right to assert jurisdiction within their reservation or
Indian Country-the foundation upon which Tribe X was able to assert jurisdiction over
Family Z. As a result, Tribe X would no longer have jurisdiction over its boundaries in
which to protect Family Z from immigration laws. In fact, Tribe X would have no
boundaries at all. Furthermore, with the loss of federal recognition, Tribe X would lose
the federal benefits, appropriations, and services on which the tribe had come to depend.
B. Pulling the Plenary Authority Card
Congress's most powerful and historically based "get out of jail free card" is
plenary authority, which is derived from the trust relationship the United States has with
federally recognized tribes.29 1  This trust relationship is based partly on the tribe's
"incorporation within the territory of the United States, and their acceptance of its
protection" which has "necessarily divested them of some aspects of the sovereignty
which they had previously exercised.' 292 Because of this incorporation, Indian tribes
283. See id.
284. Mark D. Myers, Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes in the United States, 12 Stan. L. & Policy Rev.
271, 277 (2001).
285. Id.
286. O'Brien, supran. 19, at90.
287. Kickingbird, supra n. 70, at 18.
288. Brownell, supra n. 3, at 303 ("In the 1950s and 1960s, the federal government terminated its
relationships with numerous tribes which it deemed sufficiently capable of self-government and thus no longer
in need of federal supervision or benefits.").
289. O'Brien, supra n. 19, at 205-06.
290. Id.
291. Kickingbird,supran. 70,at 18.
292. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
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implicitly surrendered exclusive jurisdiction and their full sovereignty. 293 Currently,
federally recognized tribes retain a distinctive type of sovereignty.
294
It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. But until
Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian tribes still
possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication
as a necessary result of their dependent status.
295
As a result, Congress has the final authority to determine how it will go about protecting
Indian tribes-even if it means asserting jurisdiction over purely Indian matters.
296
Tribe X's extension of membership to Family Z exposes an immigration loophole
and a possible threat to national security. Congress will most likely choose to correct
this loophole by asserting its plenary authority over the tribes and preventing this
extension of membership to illegal immigrants. In other words, Congress will refuse to
recognize these extensions. In viewing the tribes as "wards of the nation," 291 the United
States will probably recognize this refusal as its duty to protect the Indian tribes from
infiltration by illegal immigrants. 29 8 Because Congress has the absolute authority to
protect Indian tribes in whatever manner it deems necessary, it could assert jurisdiction
over the tribes and prevent Family Z from gaining membership in the tribe.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This article argues that, as the law currently stands, membership determinations are
within the sole jurisdiction of the tribes-years of federal legislation and court decisions
concur. Throughout history, legislation, and court decisions, the responsibility of
membership determinations has moved from Indian tribes, to the federal government,
and ultimately back to the group of people with whom it belongs, the tribes. This
sovereign right of the tribes, as with all current facets of tribal sovereignty, should be
absolute-not conditional, or watered down. Identity is a vital component to the culture
and existence of Indian tribes in the United States. Making determinations as to who is
deserving of this sacred right should be within the jurisdiction of the tribes.
Since 9/11, national security and immigration issues have taken center stage and
become critical concerns facing the United States. Therefore, the jurisdictional and
sovereign ability of tribes to extend membership to illegal immigrants exposes a
potentially dangerous loophole in federal immigration laws and a possible threat to
national security. Thus, in light of national security and immigration concerns, it is clear
that the United States would refuse to recognize the extension of membership to illegal
immigrants or allow illegal immigrants to stay in the United States as tribal members.
However, in getting to this point, more than a loophole would be addressed. Tribal
membership determinations would no longer be a sovereign right of the tribes.
The federal government could address this loophole in the current law in a number
293. Id.
294. See id.
295. Id.
296. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384-85.
297. Id. at 383.
298. Id. at 384-85.
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of ways: Revoking federal recognition from tribes that are attempting to extend
membership to illegal immigrants, or asserting its firmly established plenary authority
over the tribes to prevent this extension of membership. However, in doing so, the
federal government will ignore and cast aside a firmly rooted U.S. policy-the tribal
right to membership determinations. It will revoke an integral function of tribal self-
governance and leave tribes with an even more watered-down version of tribal
sovereignty. Is Family Z a threat to national security? Is it that the federal government
cannot risk illegal immigrants circumventing the U.S. immigration system? Or is it the
over-arching concept that the federal government has no qualms with dwindling down
tribal sovereignty? Regardless, in one fell swoop, Congress will close this loophole and,
at the same time, undermine the integrity of what is left of tribal sovereignty. Tribal
sovereignty as a whole, not just membership determinations, will be left crippled in its
wake.
Sarah L. Goss*
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